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Legal decision-making in criminal contexts includes
two essential functions performed by impartial ‘‘third
parties:’’ assessing responsibility and determining an
appropriate punishment. To explore the neural un-
derpinnings of these processes, we scanned sub-
jectswith fMRIwhile they determined the appropriate
punishment for crimes that varied in perpetrator re-
sponsibility andcrimeseverity. Activitywithin regions
linked to affective processing (amygdala, medial pre-
frontal and posterior cingulate cortex) predicted pun-
ishment magnitude for a range of criminal scenarios.
By contrast, activity in right dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex distinguished between scenarios on the basis
of criminal responsibility, suggesting that it plays
a key role in third-party punishment. The same pre-
frontal region has previously been shown to be in-
volved in punishing unfair economic behavior in
two-party interactions, raising the possibility that
the cognitive processes supporting third-party legal
decision-making and second-party economic norm
enforcement may be supported by a common neural
mechanism in human prefrontal cortex.
INTRODUCTION
Though rare in the rest of the animal kingdom, large-scale coop-
eration among genetically unrelated individuals is the rule, rather
than the exception, inHomo sapiens (Henrich, 2003). Ultrasocial-
ity and cooperation in humans is made possible by our ability to
establish social norms—widely shared sentiments about appro-
priate behaviors that foster both social peace and economic
prosperity (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004a; Spitzer et al., 2007).
In turn, norm compliance relies not only on the economic self-
interest often served by cooperation and fair exchange, but
also on the credible threat of unwelcome consequences for
defection (Spitzer et al., 2007). Social order therefore depends930 Neuron 60, 930–940, December 11, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.onpunishment,whichmodernsocietiesadminister throughasys-
tem of state-empowered enforcers, guided by state-governed,
impartial, third-party decision-makers, who are not directly
affected by the norm violation and have no personal stake in its
enforcement.
The role of legal decision-makers is twofold: determining
responsibility and assigning an appropriate punishment. In
determining responsibility, a legal decision-maker must assess
whether the accused has committed a wrongful act and, if so,
whether he did it with one of several culpable states of mind
(so-called ‘‘mens rea’’) (Robinson, 2002). For many of the most
recognizable crimes, the defendant must have engaged in the
proscribed conduct with intent in order to merit punishment.
Moreover, in sentencing an individual for whom criminal respon-
sibility has been determined, a legal decision-maker must choose
a punishment that fits the crime. This sentence must ordinarily be
such that the combined nature and extent of punishment is
proportional to the combined harmfulness of the offense and
blameworthiness of the offender (Farahany and Coleman, 2006;
LaFave, 2003).
Despite its critical utility in facilitating prosocial behavior and
maintaining social order, little is known about the origins of, and
neural mechanisms underlying, our ability to make third-party
legal decisions (Garland, 2004; Garland and Glimcher, 2006;
Zeki and Goodenough, 2004). The cognitive ability to make social
norm-related judgments likely arose from the demands of social
living faced by our hominid ancestors (Henrich, 2003; Richerson
et al., 2003). These demands may have promoted the emergence
of mechanisms for assessing fairness in interpersonal exchanges
and enacting personal retaliations against individuals who be-
haved unfairly (second-party punishment) (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2004a). Recent work has greatly advanced our understanding of
how the brain evaluates fairness and makes decisions based on
the cooperative status and intentions of others during two-party
economic exchanges (de Quervain et al., 2004; Delgado et al.,
2005; King-Casas et al., 2005; Knoch et al., 2006; Sanfey et al.,
2003; Singer et al., 2004, 2006; Spitzer et al., 2007). Notably,
these studies have elucidated the neural dynamics that underlie
human altruistic punishment, in which the victim of a social
norm transgression, typically unfairness in an economic
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tional cost to himself. These findings have specifically highlighted
the importance of reward and emotion-related processes in
fueling cooperative behavior (Seymour et al., 2007). However,
how—or even whether—neural models of economic exchange
in dyadic interactions apply to impartial, third-party legal deci-
sion-making is currently unknown (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2004a). Furthermore, the importance of uncovering neural mech-
anisms underlying third-party punishment is underscored by the
proposal that the development of stable social norms in human
societies specifically required the evolution of third-party
sanction systems (Bendor and Swistak, 2001).
Given that, in great measure, criminal law strives toward the
stabilization and codification of social norms, including moral
norms, in legal rules of conduct (Robinson and Darley, 1995),
moral decision-making is inherently embedded into the legal de-
cision-making process. The relevance of moral decision-making
to an investigation of legal reasoning is highlighted by experimen-
tal findings which suggest that individuals punish according to
so-called ‘‘just deserts’’ motives; i.e., in proportion to the moral
wrongfulness of an offender’s actions (Alter et al., 2007; Carlsmith
et al., 2002; Darley and Pittman, 2003). As such, the seminal work
of Greene and others—which has demonstrated distinct contri-
butions of emotion-related and cognitive control-related brain
regions to moral decision-making (Greene et al., 2001, 2004;
Heekeren et al., 2003, 2005; Moll et al., 2002a, 2002b)—is ger-
mane to the study of legal decision-making. However, despite
the conceptual overlap between moral and legal reasoning, the
latter process is not entirely reducible to the former (Hart, 1958;
Holmes, 1991; Posner, 1998; Robinson, 1997; Robinson and
Darley, 1995). Indeed, whereas determining blameworthiness
may in many cases fall under the rubric of moral decision-making,
the distinctive core and distinguishing feature of legal decision-
making is the computation and implementation of a punishment
that is appropriate both to the relative moral blameworthiness
of an accused criminal offender, and to the relative severity of
that criminal offense (Robinson, 1997; Robinson and Darley,
1995). The present study is focused on elucidating the neural
mechanisms underlying this third-party, legal decision-making
process.
In this study, we used event-related fMRI to reveal the neural
circuitry supporting third-party decision-making about criminal
responsibility and punishment. Given that these two legally dis-
tinct judgments are rendered on the basis of differing information
and considerations (LaFave et al., 2007), we were particularly
interested in determining whether these two decision-making
processes may rely on at least partly distinct neural systems.
To address this issue, we scanned 16 participants while they de-
termined the appropriate punishment for actions committed by
the protagonist (named ‘‘John’’) in a series of 50 written scenar-
ios. Each of these scenarios belonged to one of three categories:
Responsibility (R), Diminished-Responsibility (DR), and No-
Crime (NC). Scenarios in the Responsibility set (n = 20) described
John intentionally committing a criminal action ranging from
simple theft to rape and murder. The Diminished-Responsibility
set (n = 20) included actions of comparable gravity to those de-
scribed in the Responsibility set but also contained mitigating
circumstances that may have excused or justified the otherwise
criminal behavior of the protagonist by calling his blameworthi-
ness into question. The No-Crime set (n = 10) depicted John
engaged in noncriminal actions that were otherwise structured
similarly to the Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility
scenarios (scenarios available as Supplemental Experimental
Procedures). Participants rated each scenario on a scale from
0–9, according to how much punishment they thought John
deserved, with ‘‘0’’ indicating no punishment and ‘‘9’’ indicating
extreme punishment. Two groups of 50 scenarios (equated for
word length between conditions and between groups) were
constructed and their presentation counterbalanced across the
16 participants. The Responsibility set of group 2 consisted of
group 1 Diminished-Responsibility scenarios for which the miti-
gating circumstances had been removed, while the Diminished-
Responsibility set of group 2 consisted of group 1 Responsibility
scenarios with mitigating circumstances added. Thus, each
criminal scenario (e.g., depicting theft, assault or murder) in the
Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility condition was
created by modifying identical ‘‘stem’’ stories, with salient details
such as magnitude of harm matched between conditions.
RESULTS
Behavioral Data
Behavioral data showed a significant effect of scenario category
on punishment ratings [F (1,15) = 358.61, p < 0.001] (Figure 1),
with higher mean ratings for the Responsibility (mean = 5.50,
SE = 0.22) as compared with the Diminished-Responsibility
scenarios (Mean = 1.45, SE = 0.21) (p < 0.001, paired t test), in-
dicating that assessed punishment was strongly modulated by
the protagonist’s criminal responsibility. However, the fact that
the mean punishment rating for the Diminished-Responsibility
condition was greater than 0 suggests that some participants still
attributed some blameworthiness to the protagonist despite the
Figure 1. Punishment and Arousal Ratings for Each Scenario Type
While punishment and arousal scores were similar in the Responsibility condi-
tion, punishment scores were significantly lower than arousal scores in the
Diminished-Responsibility condition. Error bars = SEM.Neuron 60, 930–940, December 11, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 931
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tional experience elicited by the scenarios, all participants
completed postscan ratings of emotional arousal for each sce-
nario. These ratings also demonstrated an effect of condition
[F (1,15) = 94.61, p < 0.001] (Figure 1), with greater mean arousal
scores for the Responsibility (Mean = 4.83, SE = 0.41) compared
to the Diminished-Responsibility scenarios (Mean = 3.48, SE =
0.35) (p < 0.001, paired t test). Additionally, we found a significant
interaction between rating type (punishment versus arousal)
and condition (Responsibility versus Diminished-Responsibility)
[F (1,15) = 68.8, p < 0.001] such that, while the punishment and
arousal ratings were not significantly different for the Responsi-
bility scenarios (p > 0.05, paired t test), punishment ratings
were significantly lower than the arousal ratings for the Dimin-
ished-Responsibility scenarios (p < 0.001, paired t test) (Figure 1).
Lastly, we found a main effect of scenario condition on reaction
times (RTs) [F (1,15) = 21.87, p < 0.001], such that RTs were
shortest for the No-Crime condition and longest for the Dimin-
ished-Responsibility condition (mean, SE for: Responsibility =
12.69 s, 0.46; Diminished-Responsibility = 13.76 s, 0.46;
No-Crime = 11.12 s, 0.44; respectively) (all paired comparisons
p < 0.01).
fMRI Data: Criminal Responsibility
To identify brain regions that were sensitive to information about
criminal responsibility, we contrasted brain activity between
Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility scenarios. The
resulting statistical parametric map (SPM) revealed an area of
activation in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC,
Brodmann Area 46, peak at Talaraich coordinates 39, 37, 22
[x,y,z]; Figure 2A) that was significantly more activated in the
Responsibility as compared with the Diminished-Responsibility
condition. Time course analyses of peak activation differences
confirmed that there was greater rDLPFC activity in Responsibil-
ity compared with Diminished-Responsibility or No-Crime condi-
tions (R > DR, p = 0.002; R > NC, p = 0.0004; paired t tests; see
Figure 2B) and no difference between the Diminished-Responsi-
bility and No-Crime conditions (p = 0.19). No effect of condition
was found in the left DLPFC (p > 0.2 for all paired comparisons;
see Experimental Procedures), and the rDLPFC was significantly
more engaged than the left DLPFC in the Responsibility condi-
tion (p = 0.04, paired t test), suggesting that punishment-related
prefrontal activation is confined to the right hemisphere. Bilateral
anterior intraparietal sulcus (aIPS) demonstrated a pattern of re-
sponsibility-related activity that was similar to rDLPFC (Table S1
and Figure S1 available online, Supplemental Results), whereas
the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) showed the reverse pattern,
with more activity in the Diminished-Responsibility as compared
with the Responsibility condition (Table S1, Figure 3, see below).
Greater rDLPFC activation in the Responsibility condition did
not simply result from longer time on task: RTs to Responsibility
scenarios were shorter than those of Diminished-Responsibility
scenarios (p = 0.005, paired t test), and the effect of condition
on rDLPFC activity was still significant when response time was
used as a covariate in an analysis of covariance [ANCOVA, F
(1,37) = 10.15, p = 0.003] or when response times were equated
Figure 2. Relationship between Responsibility
Assessment and rDLPFC Activity
(A) SPM displaying the rDLPFC VOI (rendered on a
single-subject T1-weighted image), based on the con-
trast of BOLD activity between the Responsibility and
Diminished-Responsibility conditions. t(15) > 3.5, q <
0.05, random effects analysis. R = Right Hemisphere.
(B) BOLD activity time courses in rDLPFC for the Re-
sponsibility, Diminished-Responsibility, and No-Crime
conditions. BOLD peak amplitude was significantly
greater in the Responsibility condition compared
with both the Diminished-Responsibility and No-
Crime conditions (p = 0.002, p = 0.0004, respectively).
Peak was defined as the single TR with maximal signal
change from baseline within the first 13 volumes after
scenario presentation onset. t tests were performed
on these peak volumes, which were defined sepa-
rately for each condition and each subject.
(C) BOLD activity time courses in rDLPFC for Respon-
sibility, ‘‘nonpunished’’ Diminished-Responsibility (Di-
minished-Responsibility 0), ‘‘punished’’ Responsibility
(Diminished-Responsibility 1–9), and No-Crime sce-
narios. BOLD peak amplitude was significantly greater
in punished compared with nonpunished Diminished-
Responsibility scenarios (p = 0.04), while no difference
was observed between nonpunished Diminished-
Responsibility and No-Crime scenarios (p = 0.98).
(D) Relationship between BOLD peak amplitude in
rDLPFC and punishment ratings in the Responsibility
condition. These two variables were not significantly
correlated (p > 0.15).
Error bars = SEM.932 Neuron 60, 930–940, December 11, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.
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0.006; R > NC, p = 0.002; Figure S2). In addition, rDLPFC activity
was not correlated with RT (p = 0.09 in Responsibility scenarios,
p = .12 in Diminished-Responsibility scenarios). We also as-
sessed whether the activity pattern in rDLPFC might have been
driven by between-condition differences in emotional arousal
rather than by differences in criminal responsibility. To this end,
we performed a peak activation difference analysis between
the Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility conditions
after equating their mean arousal ratings (Responsibility = 3.62,
Diminished-Responsibility = 3.50; p > 0.10, paired t test; see Ex-
perimental Procedures). The results still revealed greater rDLPFC
activity in the Responsibility condition as compared with the
Diminished-Responsibility condition, even in the absence of
arousal differences (p = 0.0005, paired t test).
If rDLPFC is involved in the decision-making process to punish
blameworthy behavior, then this brain region should be more
activated during Diminished-Responsibility scenarios in which
subjects still decided to punish (punishment ratings of 1 or
greater) as compared with Diminished-Responsibility scenarios
in which they did not (punishment ratings of 0). Consistent with
this hypothesis, rDLPFC activity was higher in ‘‘punished’’ Dimin-
ished-Responsibility trials than in ‘‘nonpunished’’ Diminished-
Responsibility trials (p = 0.04, paired t test, Figure 2). In turn,
rDLPFC activity during nonpunished Diminished-Responsibility
trials was not greater than that in No-Crime trials (p = 0.98, Fig-
ure 2). These results, as well as those for aIPS (Supplemental
Results, Figure S1), strongly support the notion that prefrontal
and parietal activity is modulated by a punishment-related
decisional process.
In addition to the peak activation differences, the time course of
rDLPFC activity revealed an early deactivation (negative percent-
signal change [PSC] from baseline) around 8 s poststimulus
onset. Importantly, this early deactivation (‘‘dip’’) does not ac-
count for the peak activation results outlined above: the activa-
tion differences between conditions at the dip do not predict
corresponding activation differences at the peak (correlation of
subjects’ activity differences between the Responsibility and
Diminished-Responsibility conditions at the dip and at the
peak: r = 0.19, p = 0.49; Figure S3; see Experimental Proce-
dures). Furthermore, rDLPFC activity during nonpunished Dimin-
ished-Responsibility and No-Crime trials strongly differed at the
dip (p = 0.008) but not at the peak (p = 0.97), indicating that
peak activation differences are not simply carryover effects
from differences during the dip.
fMRI Data: Punishment Magnitude
The finding that rDLPFC activity was higher when subjects de-
cided to punish, in either Responsibility scenarios or in punished
Diminished-Responsibility trials, raised the possibility that this
brain region might track the amount of assessed punishment
for a given criminal scenario. However, rDLPFC signal amplitude
was not correlated with punishment ratings (r =0.33, p = 0.15;
Figure 2D) in the Responsibility condition. This finding suggests
that the magnitude of punishment is not simply coded by a linear
increase in rDLPFC activity.
Although rDLPFC activity was not proportional to punishment
amount, a linear relationship between peak BOLD amplitude
and punishment magnitude was found in a set of brain regions
that have been extensively linked to social and affective process-
ing. To isolate such effects, we compared Responsibility scenar-
ios with high punishment ratings to those with low ratings (median
split by scenario across subjects; see Experimental Procedures).
The resulting SPM revealed activation in the right amygdala (peak
Talairach coordinates 29,7,13; Figure 4; Figure S5) as well as
in other brain regions commonly associated with social and affec-
tive processing (LeDoux, 2000; Phelps, 2006; Phillips et al., 2003;
Price, 2005), including the posterior cingulate, temporal pole,
dorsomedial and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and inferior
frontal gyrus (Table S2; Figures S4 and S5). The association be-
tween amygdala activity and punishment magnitude was further
demonstrated by a strong correlation between amygdala BOLD
signal and punishment ratings across Responsibility scenarios
(r = 0.70, p = 0.001; Figure 4). However, punishment rating was
not the only variable that correlated with amygdala function, as
participants’ arousal ratings yielded a similar correlation with
Figure 3. Relationship between Responsibility Assessment and Bilateral Temporo-Parietal Junction Activity
(A) SPM displaying the right and left temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) VOIs (rendered on a single-subject T1-weighted image), based on the contrast of BOLD
activity in the Diminished-Responsibility condition and that of the Responsibility condition. t(15) > 3.5, q < 0.05; random effects analysis. R = Right Hemisphere.
BOLD activity time courses in right (B) and left (C) TPJ for the Responsibility, Diminished-Responsibility, and No-Crime conditions are also shown. BOLD peak
amplitude was significantly greater in the Diminished-Responsibility condition compared with the Responsibility condition for right (p = 0.0005) and left (p = 0.001)
TPJ. Peak was defined as the single TR with maximal signal change from baseline within the first 13 volumes after scenario presentation onset. t tests were
performed on these peak volumes, which were defined separately for each condition and each subject. Error bars = SEM.Neuron 60, 930–940, December 11, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 933
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arousal ratings were themselves highly correlated (r = 0.98, p =
0.000001). Correlations between peak BOLD signal and punish-
ment ratings (and between peak BOLD signal and arousal ratings)
also held for a number of the other affective regions, including
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex
(Table S2; Figures S4 and S5), indicating that the relationship
between affective processing and punishment involved a
distributed neural circuit.
Although the correlation between amygdala activity and
punishment scores could be interpreted as evidence for a role
of emotional arousal in the assignment of deserved punishment,
it is also possible that such activity simply reflected subjects’
emotional reaction to the graphic content of the scenarios
rather than its involvement in the decision-making process per
se. To avoid the potential arousal confound inherent to an exam-
ination of criminal scenarios that differ in graphic content (as was
the case for our comparison of high versus low punishment
scores within the Responsibility condition), we examined the
relationship between punishment ratings and amygdala activity
after controlling for the possible confounding effect of graphic
arousal. Because Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility
scenarios were equated for graphic content and differed only
by the presence of mitigating circumstances (see Experimental
Procedures), the potentially confounding contribution of graphic
arousal to amygdala activity in the Responsibility scenarios can
be controlled for by subtracting amygdala activity in the Dimin-
ished-Responsibility scenarios from that in the corresponding
Responsibility scenarios. If amygdala activity appertains to
punishment magnitude rather than, or in addition to, emotional
arousal related to the graphic content of the scenarios, it should
still track punishment ratings even after subtracting out graphic
content differences in the scenarios. To this end, we created,
for each pair of Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility
scenarios, punishment rating difference scores (Responsibility
minus Diminished-Responsibility) and assessed whether these
scores were correlated with the corresponding difference scores
for peak amygdala BOLD signal. That correlation was significant
(r = 0.62, p = 0.001; Figure 4), indicating that the magnitude of
amygdala BOLD signal difference between Responsibility and
Diminished-Responsibility conditions for a given scenario pre-
dicted a corresponding change in punishment rating for that
scenario. Similar correlations were found in posterior cingulate
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Table S2). These findings
suggest that activity within brain regions previously implicated
in social and affective processing reflects third-party decisions
about how much to punish, even after controlling for the poten-
tially confounding arousal associated with the graphic content of
the criminal scenarios.
DISCUSSION
The present findings suggest that the two fundamental compo-
nents of third-party legal decision-making—determining respon-
sibility and assigning an appropriate punishment magnitude—
are not supported by a single neural system. In particular, the
results reveal a key role for the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
in third-party punishment. This brain region appears to be in-
volved in deciding whether or not to punish based on an assess-
ment of criminal responsibility. The only other brain region that
demonstrated a comparable pattern of responsibility-related
activity (R > DR, R > NC, DR = NC) to rDLPFC was the aIPS (Ta-
ble S1, Figure S1, Supplemental Results). This parietal region
has been associated with a number of diverse cognitive func-
tions including general response selection (Gobel et al., 2004)
and quantitative numerical comparisons (Dehaene et al., 1999,
2003; Feigenson et al., 2004), which may hint at a role for this
area in associating a specific action (i.e. selecting a punishment
outcome) with a given scenario.
Our results also implicate neural substrates for social and
affective processing (including amygdala, medial prefrontal cor-
tex, and posterior cingulate cortex) in third-party punishment,
albeit in ways distinct from the rDLPFC. Specifically, while
prefrontal activity was linked to a categorical aspect of legal
Figure 4. Relationship between Punishment and Right Amygdala Activity
(A) SPM displaying the right amygdala VOI (rendered on a single-subject T1-weighted image), based on the contrast of BOLD activity between high and low
punishment (computed from the median split for Responsibility scenarios), thresholded at t(15) > 4.1, p < 0.001 (uncorrected) for visualization. This amygdala
activation survives correction for multiple comparisons. q < 0.05; random effects analysis. R = Right Hemisphere.
(B) Relationship between BOLD peak amplitude in the right amygdala and punishment ratings in the Responsibility condition. These two variables were
significantly positively correlated (p = 0.001).
(C) Relationship between condition differences in right amygdala BOLD peak amplitude (Responsibility minus Diminished-Responsibility) and condition
differences in punishment score (Responsibility minus Diminished-Responsibility); these two variables are significantly correlated (p = 0.001).934 Neuron 60, 930–940, December 11, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.
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of criminal responsibility), the magnitude of assigned punish-
ments for criminal transgressions parametrically modulated
activity in affective brain regions, even after controlling for the
potentially confounding arousal-related activity associated with
the graphic content of the criminal scenarios. Our findings sug-
gest that a set of brain regions (e.g., amygdala, medial prefrontal
cortex, and posterior cingulated cortex) consistently linked to
social and emotional processing (Adolphs, 2002; Amodio and
Frith, 2006; Barrett et al., 2007; Lieberman, 2007; Phelps,
2006; Phillips et al., 2003; Zald, 2003) is associated with the
amount of assigned punishment during legal decision-making.
As such, these results accord well with prior work pointing to so-
cial and emotional influences on economic decision-making and
moral reasoning (De Martino et al., 2006; Delgado et al., 2005;
Koenigs and Tranel, 2007; Greene and Haidt, 2002; Greene
et al., 2001, 2004; Haidt, 2001; Heekeren et al., 2003; Koenigs
et al., 2007; Moll et al., 2002b, 2005), and provide preliminary
neuroscientific support for a proposed role of emotions in legal
decision-making (Arkush, 2008; Maroney, 2006). Our data con-
cur with behavioral studies that have proposed a link between af-
fect and punishment motivation in both second- and third-party
contexts, and are consistent with the hypothesis that third-party
sanctions are fueled by negative emotions toward norm violators
(Darley and Pittman, 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004a, 2004b;
Seymour et al., 2007). However, it must be acknowledged that the
present conclusions rest exclusively on correlational data. Thus,
additional research will be required to confidently determine the
contributions of socio-affective brain regions to third-party pun-
ishment in the absence of any graphic arousal confound. In par-
ticular, it will be important in future experiments to fully dissociate
the factors of crime severity and arousal by employing task con-
ditions that manipulate arousal without affecting crime severity.
Furthermore, future research should also focus on determining
how these affective brain regions interact with DLPFC during
third-party punishment decisions.
An additional concern in interpreting our findings, or any others
based on simulated judgments, is whether they are relevant to
real-world decision-making. After all, the punishment decisions
made by our participants did not have direct, real-world conse-
quences for real criminal defendants. Thus, it remains to be
seen if our findings, generated by examining brain activation
patterns during hypothetical judgments, will generalize to cir-
cumstances in which real punishments are made. However, there
is some evidence suggesting that the hypothetical judgments
made by our subjects may be a good proxy measure for real-
world legal judgments. For example, postscan debriefing of our
subjects indicated that their punishment assessments were
implicitly legal, with lower numbers corresponding to low prison
sentences and higher numbers corresponding to high prison
sentences (see Table S3). Thus, participants appeared to adopt
an internal punishment scale based on incarceration duration—
a legal metric—when making their judgments, even in the ab-
sence of explicit instructions to do so. Further, we found that
participants’ decisions about punishment amount for each of
the crimes depicted in the Responsibility scenarios were strongly
correlated with the recommended prison sentences for those
crimes, according to the benchmark sentencing guidelines of
North Carolina, a model state penal code (r = 0.8, p < .0001;
Figure S6; see Experimental Procedures). Thus, although our
subjects were not literally applying a criminal statute to an ac-
cused individual, these data suggest that subjects’ punishment
decisions were consistent with statutory legal reasoning. How-
ever, despite these suggestions, further empirical studies are
required to confirm our supposition that neuroimaging studies
of simulated third-party legal decision-making can validly model
real-world legal reasoning.
Relative Contributions of TPJ and rDPLFC to Third-Party
Punishment Decisions
The neural mechanisms of third-party punishment are undoubt-
edly complex, involving a dynamic regional interplay that unfolds
in a temporally specific manner. In particular, the decision to pun-
ish a person for his blameworthy act is generally preceded by an
evaluation of that person’s intention in committing that act (Alter
et al., 2007; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley and Pittman, 2003;
Darley and Shultz, 1990; Robinson and Darley, 1995; Robinson
et al., 2007; Shultz et al., 1986). Such an evaluation ought there-
fore to activate brain regions that underlie the attribution of goals,
desires, and beliefs to others, referred to as theory of mind (TOM)
(Gallagher and Frith, 2003). One such region, the TPJ—a key
node in the distributed TOM network (Decety and Lamm, 2007;
Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Vollm
et al., 2006)—might be predicted to serve this function during le-
gal decision-making given recent evidence of its role in attributing
mental beliefs in moral judgments (Young et al., 2007) and its
involvement in dyadic economic exchange games (Rilling et al.,
2004). Given this context, it is noteworthy that the TPJ was acti-
vated in all of our conditions (Figure 3). Furthermore, TPJ came
online during the period when rDLPFC was deactivated (see
Figure 2B), a result that is consistent with the suggestion that tem-
poro-parietal cortex and DLPFC operate within largely distinct
and at times functionally opposed networks (Fox et al., 2005).
Given this proposed antagonistic response pattern in the TPJ
and DLPFC, we speculate that the early rDLPFC deactivation
may reflect a perspective-taking-based evaluation of the beliefs
and intentions of the scenarios’ protagonist, which is followed
by a robust rDLPFC activation as subjects go on to make a deci-
sion to punish based on assessed responsibility and blamewor-
thiness. However, the conclusion that rDLPFC’s biphasic time
course reflects an initial socio-evaluative process followed by a
decisional process must be viewed as tentative because the
present experiment did not constrain the temporal sequence of
evaluative and decisional processes involved in this task.
Moral versus Legal Decision-Making
The results of the present neuroimaging study underscore the
conceptual relationship between moral and legal decision-
making. Indeed, the general involvement of both the prefrontal
cortex and affective brain regions in legal reasoning is reminis-
cent of their roles in moral judgment (Greene et al., 2001, 2004).
Specifically, moral decision-making studies have indicated that
regions of lateral prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal lobe are
preferentially involved in impersonal moral judgments, whereas
socio-affective areas (e.g., amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex,
and posterior cingulate cortex) may be primarily engaged duringNeuron 60, 930–940, December 11, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 935
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Thus, both legal and moral decision-making may rely on ‘‘cold’’
deliberate computations supported by the prefrontal cortex and
‘‘hot’’ emotional processes represented in socio-affective brain
networks, although the extent to which these two decision-
making processes rely on the same brain circuitry remains to
be determined.
While these findings serve to highlight an important concep-
tual overlap between moral reasoning and legal reasoning in
criminal contexts, they do not imply that third-party punishment
decisions are reducible to moral judgment. Indeed, while legal
decision-making may in most (but not all) criminal cases have
an essential moral component, there are crucial distinctions
between morality and law (Hart, 1958; Holmes, 1991; Posner,
1998). Perhaps the most critical distinguishing feature of legal
decision-making, compared with moral decision-making, is the
action of punishment—intrinsic to the former and secondary to
the latter (Robinson, 1997). Although our participants likely eval-
uated the moral blameworthiness of the scenarios’ protagonist,
our study was designed to investigate the neural substrates of a
fundamental legal decision—assigning punishment for a crime—
that is not a defining characteristic of moral judgment. Indeed,
while moral decision-making studies to date have focused on
assessing brain function during decisions about the moral right-
ness or wrongness of actions depicted in written scenarios, they
have not specifically addressed the issue of punishment (Borg
et al., 2006; Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Heekeren et al., 2003,
2005; Kedia et al., 2008; Luo et al., 2006; Moll et al., 2001,
2002a, 2002b; Young et al., 2007; Young and Saxe, 2008).
Neural Convergence of Second-Party
and Third-Party Punishment Systems
The prefrontal cortex area activated in the present third-party
legal decision-making study corresponds well to an area that is
involved in the implementation of norm enforcement behavior
in two-party economic exchanges (peak Talairach coordinates
of 39, 37, 22 [x,y,z] for Knoch et al., 2006; Sanfey et al., 2003; ver-
sus 39, 38, 18 [x,y,z] for the present study), raising the possibility
that rDLPFC serves a function common to both third-party legal
and second-party economic decision-making. In this respect, it
is noteworthy that this region of rDLPFC is recruited when partic-
ipants decide whether or not to punish a partner by rejecting an
unfair economic deal proposed by that partner (Sanfey et al.,
2003); this result is analogous to our finding that rDLPFC is acti-
vated by the decision to punish the perpetrator of a criminal act.
Furthermore, while disruptive magnetic stimulation of this region
impairs the ability to punish economic norm violations in dyadic
exchanges (Knoch et al., 2006; van’t Wout et al., 2005), this
manipulation has no effect on norm enforcement behavior when
the unfair economic exchanges are randomly generated by a
computer instead of a human agent (Knoch et al., 2006). This
result accords well with our finding that rDLPFC was much
less activated when the scenario protagonist was not criminally
responsible for his behavior, and supports the notion that this
prefrontal cortex area is primarily recruited when punishment
can be assigned to a responsible agent (Knoch et al., 2006).
Finally, we still observed greater rDLPFC activity in the Respon-
sibility condition (as compared with Diminished-Responsibility
scenarios) when we restricted our analysis to scenarios that
only contained physical harms (p < 0.005, paired t test), suggest-
ing that the overlap of rDLPFC activity between studies of
economic decision-making and the present examination of legal
decision-making is not solely driven by scenarios describing
economic transgressions.
The parallels between these previous findings and our current
results lead us to suggest that the rDLPFC is strongly activated
by the decision to punish norm violations based on an evaluation
of the blameworthiness of the transgressor. This proposed func-
tion of rDLPFC appears to apply equally to situations where the
motive for punishment is unfair behavior in a dyadic economic
exchange or when responding to the violation of an institutional-
ized social norm in a disinterested third-party context. Of course,
confirmation of this hypothesis will require further experimental
evidence that legal and economic decision-making (and perhaps
moral decision-making as well) rely on the same neural sub-
strates. That said, this apparent overlap illustrates an important
point: that the brain regions identified in our study are not specif-
ically devoted to legal decision-making. Rather, a more parsimo-
nious explanation is that third-party punishment decisions draw
on elementary and domain-general computations supported by
the rDLPFC. In particular, on the basis of the convergence be-
tween neural circuitry mediating second-party norm enforce-
ment and impartial third-party punishment, we conjecture that
our modern legal system may have evolved by building on preex-
isting cognitive mechanisms that support fairness-related be-
haviors in dyadic interactions. Though speculative and subject
to experimental confirmation, this hypothesis is nevertheless
consistent with the relatively recent development of state-ad-
ministered law enforcement institutions, compared to the
much longer existence of human cooperation (Richerson et al.,
2003); for thousands of years before the advent of state-imple-
mented norm compliance, humans relied on personal sanctions
to enforce social norms (Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr and Gachter,
2002).
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
Sixteen right-handed individuals (eight males, ages 18–42) with normal or cor-
rected-to-normal vision participated for financial compensation. The Vander-
bilt University Institutional Review Board approved the experimental protocol,
and informed consent was obtained from each subject after they were briefed
on the nature and possible consequences of the study. A brief psychological
survey was also administered to exclude individuals who may react adversely
to the content of the criminal scenarios. Exclusion criteria included history of
psychiatric illness, being the victim of or having witnessed a violent crime
(including sexual abuse), and having experienced any trauma involving injury
or threat of injury to the subject or a close friend/family member.
Paradigm
In this experiment, subjects participated in a simulated third-party legal deci-
sion-making task in which they determined the appropriate level of punishment
for the actions of a fictional protagonist described in short written scenarios.
The principal goal of our study was to isolate the neural processes associated
with the two fundamental processes of legal decision-making: deciding
whether or not an accused individual is culpable for a given criminal act, and de-
termining the appropriate punishment for that act (a parametric process based
on the ordinal severity of a crime). Correspondingly, our design manipulated
responsibility in a dichotomous fashion and crime severity in a continuous936 Neuron 60, 930–940, December 11, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.
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ioral studies of relative blameworthiness; Robinson and Darley, 1995; Robinson
and Kurzban, 2007) depicting the actions of the protagonist named ‘‘John.’’ The
50 scenarios were subdivided into three sets (complete scenario list is available
as Supplemental Experimental Procedures). In the Responsibility set (n = 20),
the scenarios described John intentionally committing a criminal action ranging
from simple theft to rape and murder. The Diminished-Responsibility set (n = 20)
included similar actions comparable in gravity to those in the Responsibility set,
but contained circumstances that would often legally excuse or justify the oth-
erwise criminal behavior of the protagonist. The No-Crime set (n = 10) depicted
John engaged in noncriminal actions that were otherwise structured similarly to
the Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility scenarios. The No-Crime
scenarios were included to assist in interpreting activity differences between
Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility scenarios (e.g. Figure 2).
Two groups of 50 scenarios were constructed and their presentation coun-
terbalanced across the 16 participants (8 subjects received group 1 scenarios,
and 8 others received group 2 scenarios) and across gender (equal numbers of
men and women received scenarios from each group). The Responsibility set
of group 2 consisted of group 1 Diminished-Responsibility scenarios from
which the mitigating circumstances had been excised, while the Diminished-
Responsibility set of group 2 consisted of group 1 Responsibility scenarios
with mitigating circumstances added. As a result, the Responsibility and Di-
minished-Responsibility scenarios were counterbalanced across subjects,
and differed only by the presence of mitigating circumstances. Thus, exactly
the same scenario premises were used in constructing the Responsibility
and Non-Responsibility conditions. Finally, the No-Crime set was identical in
both groups of scenarios, and all scenario sets were equated for word length.
Participants rated each scenario on a scale from 0–9, according to how
much punishment they thought John deserved, with ‘‘0’’ indicating no punish-
ment and ‘‘9’’ indicating extreme punishment. Punishment was defined for
participants as ‘‘deserved penalty.’’ Participants were asked to consider
each scenario (and thus, each ‘‘John’’) independently of the others and were
encouraged to use the full scale (0–9) for their ratings. In the scanner but prior
to the functional scans, subjects were shown five practice scenarios that were
designed to span the punishment scale. Scenarios were presented as white
text (Times New Roman font) on a black background (14.2 [width] 3 9.9
[height] of visual angle). Below each scenario, text reminded participants of
the task instructions: ‘‘How much punishment do you think John deserves,
on a scale from 0 to 9 where 0 = No punishment and 9 = Extreme punishment?
By punishment, we mean deserved penalty.’’ Participants were instructed to
make a response as soon as they had reached their decision.
Each trial began with the presentation of a scenario, which remained on-
screen until participants made a button press response, or up to a maximum
of 30 s. Participants then viewed a small white fixation square (0.25 of visual
angle) for 12–14 s (as stimulus onset was synched to scan acquisition [TR =
2 s], while stimulus offset was synched to subject response), which was
followed by a larger fixation square (0.49 of visual angle) for 2 s prior to the
presentation of the next scenario. Ten scenarios (four Responsibility, four
Diminished-Responsibility, and two No-Crime)—selected randomly without
replacement from the fifty scenarios—were presented in each of the five
fMRI runs. Scenario identity and condition order were randomized for each
run. The duration of each fMRI run was variable, with a maximum length of
7.33 min. The experiment was programmed in Matlab (Mathworks, Natick
MA) using the Psychophysics Toolbox extension (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997)
and was presented using a Pentium IV PC.
Following the scanning session, participants rated the same scenarios along
scales of emotional arousal and valence. They first rated each of the 50 scenar-
ios (presented in random order on a computer screen outside the scanner) on
the basis of how emotionally aroused they felt following its presentation (0 =
calm, 9 = extremely excited). They then rated each of the scenarios, presented
again in random order, on the basis of how positive or negative they felt follow-
ing its presentation (0 = extremely positive, 9 = extremely negative). In these
sessions, subjects rated the same scenarios they viewed in the scanner. The
valence data were highly correlated with arousal ratings, and multiple regres-
sion analysis demonstrated that they did not account for any additional
variance in punishment ratings that is unaccounted for by the arousal data.
Therefore, the valence data are not further discussed in this manuscript.
Internal Scale Questionnaire
In a postscan debriefing, participants were questioned about the internal scale
of punishment they used during the scan. Specifically, participants were asked
‘‘what kind of punishment did you imagine’’? for punishment scores of 1, 3, 5,
8, and 9. There was strong agreement among participants about their internal
scale of justice. While low punishment scores (1, 3) were generally associated
with financial or social penalties, greater punishment scores (5, 8) included
incarceration time, with higher scores associated with longer jail times and,
at the extreme (9), life imprisonment or state execution.
Relationship between Punishment Ratings and Legal Statutes
To investigate the relationship between punishment ratings for Responsibility
scenarios obtained in the present experiment and an existing, statutorily
prescribed punishment for each of the crimes depicted in these scenarios,
we coded each Responsibility scenario using the criminal law and criminal
procedure statutes of the state of North Carolina. Among those states that
have a sentencing statute, North Carolina’s is widely considered to be both
comprehensive and exemplary (Stanley, 1996; Wright, 2002).
For each Responsibility scenario, we determined the crime or crimes (such
as larceny, involuntary manslaughter, or murder) with which John might rea-
sonably be charged under the criminal code of North Carolina (2005 General
Statutes of North Carolina, Chapter 14). We then determined, for each crime,
the authorized presumptive sentencing range (such as 58 to 73 months in
prison), assuming no aggravating or mitigating factors that could, under the
statute, increase or decrease the authorized sentencing range (2005 General
Statutes of North Carolina, Chapter 15A, Article 81). We then calculated and as-
signed to each scenario the mean for this range, in months. As the distribution of
sentence values was highly right-skewed, we log-transformed (natural log) to
create a normal distribution of sentence values (we verified that nontrans-
formed data produced similar correlations as transformed data). For scenarios
with multiple crimes, the averages for each respective crime were summed
(whether this summed value or simply the mean value for the most severe crime
depicted in a given scenario was used in the correlation analysis did not signif-
icantly affect the results). Where the upper limit of the sentencing range was life
in prison, it was coded as 29 years (which has been estimated as the average
time likely to be served by lifers newly admitted in 1997) (Mauer et al., 2004).
Similarly, where the upper limit of the sentencing range was death, it was
also quantified as life in prison (29 years). The log-transformed mean sentences
for each of the 20 scenarios were then correlated with the group-averaged
punishment ratings for these scenarios.
Statistical Analysis
Mean punishment and arousal scores and RTs were calculated for each subject
for each condition (Responsibility, Diminished-Responsibility, and No-Crime)
and entered into a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) using
SPSS 15 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL) to determine main effects and interactions.
Data from 16 subjects were used for all analyses. Punishment, arousal scores,
and RTs were compared between conditions and post hoc tests were per-
formed using Fisher’s Least Significant Difference (LSD) measure using an
alpha level of 0.05. Two-tailed tests were used in all cases. For correlational
analyses, data from Responsibility scenarios (n = 20) were averaged across
all (n = 16) subjects. Examination of scatterplots for the correlation of rDLPFC
signal and punishment suggested the presence of outliers. As nonparametric
correlations tend to be more robust to outliers, we used Spearman’s r to mea-
sure correlations between fMRI signal, behavioral measures, and recommen-
ded sentences. All correlations that were significant using Spearman’s
r were also significant (p < 0.05) when we employed Pearson’s r.
fMRI Data Acquisition
High-resolution 2D and 3D anatomical images were acquired with conven-
tional parameters on a 3T Philips Achieva scanner at the Vanderbilt University
Institute of Imaging Science. The visual display was presented on an LCD
panel and back-projected onto a screen positioned at the front of the magnet
bore. Subjects lied supine in the scanner and viewed the display on a mirror
positioned above them. Stimulus presentation was synchronized to fMRI
volume acquisition. Manual responses were recorded using two five-button
keypads (one for each hand; Rowland Institute of Science, Cambridge, MA).Neuron 60, 930–940, December 11, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 937
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echoplanar imaging (EPI) pulse sequence with the following parameters: TR
2000 ms, TE 25 ms, flip angle 70, FOV 220 3 220 mm, 128 3 128 matrix
with 34 axial slices (3 mm, 0.3 mm gap) oriented parallel to the gyrus rectus.
These image parameters produced good T2* signal across the brain except
in ventromedial frontal cortex, where some signal dropout was evident in all
subjects (Brodmann area 11).
Each of the 16 participants performed five fMRI runs, except for 2 partici-
pants who could only complete four runs due to technical malfunctions.
fMRI Data Preprocessing
Image analysis was performed using Brain Voyager QX 1.4 (Brain Innovation,
Maastricht, The Netherlands) with custom Matlab software (MathWorks,
Natick, MA).
Prior to random effects analysis, images were preprocessed using 3D
motion correction, slice timing correction, linear trend removal, and spatial
smoothing with a 6 mm Gaussian kernel (full width at half maximum). Subjects’
functional data were coregistered with their T1-weighted anatomical volumes
and transformed into standardized Talairach space.
Responsibility Analysis
This analysis was performed to isolate brain regions that were sensitive to
responsibility during punishment assessment. Signal values for each fMRI
run were transformed into Z-scores representing a change from the signal
mean for that run and corrected for serial autocorrelations. Design matrices
for each run were constructed by convolving a model hemodynamic response
function (double gamma, consisting of a positive g function and a small, neg-
ative g function reflecting the BOLD undershoot – SPM2, http://www.fil.ion.
ucl.ac.uk/spm) with regressors specifying volumes acquired during the entire
trial (stimulus onset to stimulus offset) for a given condition. These were
entered into a general linear model (GLM) with separate regressors created
for each condition per subject (random effects analysis). We then contrasted
the beta-weights of regressors using a t test between conditions to create
an SPM showing voxels that demonstrated significantly increased activation
in the Responsibility condition as compared with the Diminished-Responsibil-
ity condition. Predictors for the No-Crime condition were weighted with a zero
(i.e., not explicitly modeled). We applied a False-Discovery Rate (FDR) thresh-
old of q < 0.05 (with [c(V) = ln(V) + E]) to correct for multiple comparisons. Only
activations surviving this corrected threshold are reported.
Volumes of interest (VOIs) were created from the suprathreshold clusters
isolated in the above SPM at the conservative FDR threshold. The boundary
of these VOIs was drawn from SPMs thresholded using a less conservative
implementation of FDR (q < 0.05, c(V) = 1). The signal for each trial (event) in-
cluded the time course from 2 TRs (4 s) before stimulus onset to 13 TRs (26 s)
after. Each event’s signal was transformed to a PSC relative to the average of
the first three TRs (0–4 s before stimulus onset). Event-related averages
(ERAs) were created by averaging these PSC-adjusted event signals; separate
ERAs were created for each combination of VOI, condition, and subject. These
ERAs were then averaged across subjects for display purposes.
As subjects were instructed to make a response as soon as they had reached
a decision about punishment amount, and in keeping with other neuroimaging
studies of decision-making (Aron and Poldrack, 2006; Coricelli et al., 2005; Dux
et al., 2006; Ivanoff et al., 2008; Rahm et al., 2006), decision-related activity
should correspond to the portion of the time course that follows subjects’
response. Given that mean RTs hovered around 12 s (mean, SE for: Responsi-
bility = 12.69 s, 0.46; Diminished-Responsibility = 13.76 s, 0.46; No-Crime =
11.12 s, 0.44; respectively) and accounting for a hemodynamic peak rise time
of about 5 s poststimulus (Boynton et al., 1996; Friston et al., 1994; Heeger
and Ress, 2002), peridecision activity should occur approximately 17 s after trial
onset, which corresponds well with the time of peak hemodynamic response
observed in rDLPFC (see Figure 2). We therefore used the peak hemodynamic
response as a measure of decision-related activity. To determine condition ef-
fects on BOLD signal within a given brain region, we then contrasted each con-
dition’s activation averaged across subjects by using paired t tests applied on
these peak estimates. The peak was experimentally defined as the single
volume with maximal signal change from baseline between volumes 1 and 13
(2–26 s poststimulus onset). However, we ascertained that the same results
were obtained when the peak was defined using a narrower volume range of
14 to 22 s poststimulus (R > DR, p = 0.00070; R > NC, p = 0.00025; DR > NC,
p = 0.19), or even when using a single volume 16 s poststimulus (R > DR, p =
0.00023; R > NC, p = 0.00027; DR > NC, p = 0.84). Thus, our rDLPFC peak
activation results are insensitive to the temporal width of the analysis window.
Arousal- and Reaction-Time-Equated Analyses
To determine whether activation differences between the Responsibility and
Diminished-Responsibility conditions were driven by punishment assessment
rather than any differences in arousal, these two conditions were compared
after equating for arousal ratings. This was accomplished by deleting the six
trials with the highest arousal ratings from the Responsibility condition for
each subject. Time courses were extracted and peak differences were
compared as above.
We also determined whether RT differences between the Responsibility,
Diminished-Responsibility, and No-Crime conditions affected the brain activa-
tion results by comparing these conditions after equating for response times.
This was accomplished by deleting, for each subject, the trials with the highest
RTs for Diminished-Responsibility scenarios and the trials with the lowest RTs
for the No-Crime scenarios until the RTs across conditions (for each subject)
were approximately equal (p > 0.1 for all paired t tests between conditions). In
addition, we compared rDLPFC activation between Responsibility and Dimin-
ished-Responsibility scenarios controlling forRT by performing a GLMANCOVA
using the extracted rDLPFC BOLD signal and punishment RTs for each Respon-
sibility and Diminished-Responsibility scenario averaged across subjects.
Dissociation of Activation Peak and Deactivation Dip
To assess the relationship between early (8 s) deactivation in the rDLPFC
time course and later (16 s) peak activation, we calculated peak and dip
values for the Responsibility and Diminished-Responsibility conditions from
each subject’s ERA. Peak and dip were defined as the volume with the maxi-
mal positive and maximal negative change from baseline, respectively. For
each subject, we subtracted the Diminished-Responsibility peak value from
the Responsibility peak value, and the Diminished-Responsibility dip value
from the Responsibility dip value. Per-subject peak and dip difference values
were then correlated via Spearman bivariate correlation in SPSS 15.
Laterality Analyses
To confirm the lateral specificity of Responsibility-related activation in rDLPFC,
we extracted BOLD signal from the corresponding left DLPFC VOI (i.e., ‘‘x-mir-
rored’’ VOI, centered on Talairach coordinate 39, 37, 22). We performed
a two-way ANOVA with ‘‘Condition’’ (Responsibility, Diminished-Responsibil-
ity, and No-Crime) and ‘‘Side’’ (Left and Right) as independent variables and
BOLD signal as the dependent variable. Post hoc comparisons between con-
ditions in each hemisphere, and between hemispheres for the Responsibility
condition, were performed using paired t tests.
Punishment Rating Analysis
To identify brain regions that tracked the degree of punishment subjects
assigned to a scenario, we performed a median split for punishment scores
given during Responsibility scenarios. Based on the median punishment value
for each scenario in the Responsibility condition across subjects, scenarios
were separated into two groups, high and low. Design matrices and GLMs
were constructed as above, with predictors for high and low scores for each
subject specifying volumes acquired during Responsibility trials on which
a high or low punishment score was given, respectively. We contrasted the
beta-weights of these predictors using a t test between high and low punish-
ments to create an SPM showing voxels that demonstrated significantly
increased activation during Responsibility trials in which subjects gave high
(at or above the median) punishments relative to Responsibility trials in which
subjects gave low (below the median) punishments. We applied a threshold of
q < 0.05 FDR to correct for multiple comparisons. Using a conservative imple-
mentation of the FDR correction technique (c(V) = ln(V) + E), we did not find
significant activation differences. We report activations significant at FDR
q < 0.05, using a less conservative implementation of FDR (c(V) = 1). The
differences between the two implementations relate to assumptions about
the independence of tests being performed on the data; both are valid controls
for multiple testing in functional imaging data (Genovese et al., 2002).
VOIs were created as described for the Responsibility analysis. The
extracted peak activation values were used for a correlation analysis between938 Neuron 60, 930–940, December 11, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.
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Responsibility scenarios, the peak amplitude of the group-averaged ERA
was computed, and the resulting value was correlated with the corresponding
group-averaged punishment rating for that scenario. These peak values were
also used in the between-condition difference score analyses.
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA
The supplemental data for this article include Supplemental Results, six
supplemental Figures, Experimental Scenarios, and three supplemental
Tables and can be found at http://www.neuron.org/supplemental/S0896-
6273(08)00889-1.
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